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I.

Introduction

1. The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) rests much of its Decision to deny authorization of
an investigation on the “interests of justice.” Whether or not “interests of justice”
considerations are jurisdictional is subject to dispute. However, there is at least one
aspect of the impugned Decision concerning possible war crimes that the PTC has
acknowledged to be jurisdictional: the notion that events occurring on the territory
of a State Party to the Rome Statute other than Afghanistan lack sufficient nexus to
the armed conflict to trigger application of Rome Statute.1 I believe this conclusion
incorrectly construes the Rome Statute in two respects. First, the PTC incorrectly
concludes that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (CA 3) applies only
to purely internal non-international armed conflicts. Second, the PTC incorrectly
construes the relevant provision in the Elements of Crimes that the conduct must
occur “in the context of” the non-international armed conflict, and must be
associated with it.

II. Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 applies to transnational, as well as to
internal, non-international armed conflicts; a proper balance between
interests of military necessity and humanity yield a broader geographic
scope of application of Geneva Law than of Hague Law
2. In recognition that wars happen despite a prohibition of aggression in international
relations, the Law of Armed Conflict, or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is
designed to strike a balance between the dictates of military necessity and humanity.2

This brief does not address crimes against humanity, for which no nexus to armed conflict is
required.
2 “The primary purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to protect the victims of armed
conflict and to regulate the conduct of hostilities based on a balance between military necessity and
humanity.” Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42
International Law and Politics 831 (2012).
1
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The need to strike this balance is equally applicable to non-international and
international armed conflict, and so, IHL applies to both types of armed conflict.

3. For purposes of this case, two foundational points are relevant.

4. First, it is critical to note that IHL is historically divided into two categories of rules:
those regulating conduct of hostilities (Hague Law) and those regulating protection of
persons in the power of the enemy (Geneva Law). When considering the geographic
scope of application of IHL, it is necessary to distinguish between “Hague Law” issues
and “Geneva Law” issues in the application of metrics balancing military necessity
and humanity. In other words, IHL rules for protection of civilians and combatants
hors de combat may apply even where IHL-based targeting is impermissible.3 The
reason is simple. Outside of a zone of hostilities, domestic policing functions are
presumed to operate. “Enemy combatants” and hostile civilians can be detained rather
than killed, subject to the existence of grounds and compliance with procedures
established by applicable law. In other words, the dictates of humanity greatly exceed
any conceivable military necessity to target persons under the more permissive rules
of IHL, where the more restrictive rules of domestic and human rights law are fully
operable. At the same time, there is no conceivable military necessity to withhold
application of the humanitarian provisions of IHL that are Geneva Law to persons
who, outside the territory of hostilities, have been rendered hors de combat through
deprivation of liberty. In fact, there is every humanitarian reason to apply those
provisions, including CA3.

5. Second, it is also critical to note that the notion of a ‘Common Article 3 noninternational armed conflict’ is broader than that of ‘internal armed conflict.’4 It is well

Whether or not there exists an IHL-based authority to detain in non-international armed conflict, let
alone outside the State in which hostilities occur, is a controversial issue. I believe that the IHL of noninternational armed conflict neither authorizes nor prohibits such detention. But if such detention
occurs, and has a factual nexus to a non-international armed conflict, the failure to comply with the
requirements of Common Article 3 may constitute a war crime.
4 Decision, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2fb1f4/pdf/, Para 55.
3
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understood that an armed conflict is non-international even though the hostilities are
not confined to a single state, as long as the hostilities are between a State and a nonState armed group or between two (or more) non-State armed groups. The Rome
Statute clearly does not limit jurisdiction over non-international armed conflict-based
war crimes to those committed in purely internal armed conflicts.5 While it is true that
the drafters of CA3 had internal armed conflicts in mind, such a limitation would leave
“spill-over” armed conflicts and “foreign intervention” armed conflicts, which one
noted IHL academic has observed are “legion” today6, outside the bounds of IHL.
Given that some of the States most frequently and broadly engaged in extraterritorial
non-international hostilities deny the application of human rights law either to armed
conflict, or extraterritorially, or both, the exclusion of such hostilities from the coverage
of CA 3 would result in an untenable legal black hole.

6. The PTC ruled that events occurring beyond Afghanistan cannot be considered war
crimes under the Rome Statute because CA3 is limited in application to conflicts
occurring “on the territory of one of the State Parties” to the Geneva Conventions.
There are several sources of jurisprudence and other authority contradicting this
conclusion. I will focus on the five most persuasive examples:

7. (a) The ‘scope of application’ language of Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the
Geneva Conventions is consistent with an understanding that CA3 applies beyond the
territory of hostilities. AP II is meant to supplement CA3 and according to its Article

The Statute applies "to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups. Art. 8(2)(f), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
6 M. Milanovic and V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, “A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict”; Research Handbook on
International Conflict and Security Law; White, Christian Henderson, eds., Edward Elgar, (2012), at p. 31.
5
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1, applies to armed conflicts taking place on the territory of “a” High Contracting Party
(not “one” High Contracting Party).

8. (b) It has also frequently been noted that the CA3 phrase “on the territory of one of
the High Contracting parties” was not meant to apply CA3 only to purely internal
armed conflicts, but rather, to distinguish States that were party to the Geneva
Conventions from those that were not. Today, as all States are Party, the distinction is
moot. This is the ICRC position.7

9. (c) On 7 February 2002, United States President George Bush issued a Memorandum
in which he claimed that Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees did not fall within the
protection of CA3, because that provision applies only to armed conflicts “not of an
international character,” and the relevant armed conflict was, instead, international.8
The issue was litigated in connection with detention of alleged “enemy combatants”
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, far from the hostilities taking place in Afghanistan. In
Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that
CA3 applies only to armed conflicts occurring “in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties” (emphasis added) to the Geneva Conventions. Instead, the Court

See, International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in
International Humanitarian Law? (17 March 2008).
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. See also, N. Melzer,
“Targeted Killing in International Law”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2008), p. 258. See also, Jelena
Pejic, “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye”, Vol. 93, No. 81
International Review of the Red Cross, (2011), pp. 11-14.
8 https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/presidential-memo-feb-7-2002-humane-treatment-al-qaedaand-taliban-detainees
7
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ruled that alleged Al Qaeda member Salim Hamdan, was protected by CA3, which
provides a floor of protections to all armed conflict detainees.9

10. (d) Another source of consistent authority is the International Court of Justice,
which has opined that CA3 applies to all armed conflicts.10 There is no evidence that
the Court would except transnational non-international armed conflicts.

11. (e) Likewise, the UN Security Council also acknowledged the extraterritorial reach
of CA3 by applying the Rwanda Tribunal Statute to CA3 violations committed in
States that neighbor Rwanda.11

12. The consistent positions expressed by these authorities are essential to fulfilment
of the humanitarian purposes of IHL, in general, and of CA3, in particular. Any other
interpretation would result in an untenable gap in the application of IHL to armed
conflict, potentially relegating some of the most vulnerable people in the world –
persons hors de combat and deprived of liberty in armed conflict – to a legal black hole.

III. “In the context of” and “associated with” armed conflict may well be
cumulative factors, but “in the context of” armed conflict does not mean
“only on the territory of armed conflict.”
13. The PTC understands this language from the Rome Statute Elements of Crimes to
mean that the Rome Statute’s war crimes provisions apply only to conduct occurring
within the territory of the High Contracting Party in which hostilities occur. I
participated in the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes as a Legal Advisor in the

Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. Donald H. Rumsfeld et al; 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June 1986, para. 218, accessed at
www.icj-cij.org
11 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Statute, Art. 1, accessed at:
http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html.
9

10
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Legal Division of the ICRC and make the following representations from my personal
recollection of the process.

14. Had the drafters wanted to limit jurisdiction to conduct occurring on the territory
of the State experiencing hostilities, they easily could have said so. Instead, this
language was crafted to make clear that simply because conduct does occur on the
territory of a State experiencing a non-international armed conflict, it is not necessarily
“associated with” the armed conflict. For example, if a man kills his wife’s lover in
Kabul, the killing may be considered to be in the territorial context of armed conflict,
but not its logical context, and therefore, not associated with it. This does not mean,
however, that acts outside the territory of hostilities, for example, torture of a detainee
in Poland, are per se outside the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan. If the
torture is committed by a party to the armed conflict, against an individual alleged to
be acting in support of an opposing party to the armed conflict, and for purposes
related to the armed conflict, the nexus and association requirements are met. In other
words, there is no indication the drafters meant to exclude coverage of conduct clearly
associated with armed conflict, simply because it occurred beyond the territory of
hostilities.

IV.

Conclusion

15. Acts committed outside the territory of the State in which non-international armed
conflict hostilities occur may well be beyond the scope of IHL’s ‘conduct of hostilities
(Hague Law) provisions, but cannot be beyond the scope of its rules for protection of
persons in the power of the enemy (Geneva Law), including CA 3. This conclusion is
consistent with the object and purpose of IHL generally to provide maximal protection
to persons hors de combat in armed conflict. Where a State proves unwilling or unable
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction to hold accountable those who commit offenses
defined in the Rome Statute, and where such offenses are committed on the territory
of a State Party to the Rome Statute, the rejection of jurisdiction is incompatible with
the ICC’s scheme of complementarity and the Rome Statute’s object and purpose to
No. ICC-02/17
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prevent impunity for those most responsible for the most serious violations of
international law.

16. For these reasons, I respectfully suggest reversal of the PTC’s jurisdictional
determination that conduct occurring beyond the boundaries of Afghanistan are
necessarily beyond the scope of the Rome Statute’s war crimes provisions.

17. I thank the Appeals Chamber for the opportunity to contribute these views.
Respectfully submitted,

Gabor Rona
Dated this 14th day of November 2019
At New York, NY, United States of America.
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